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The Annual Herbert Smith Freehills – 
Singapore Management University 
Asian Arbitration Lecture 2014 – by 
Fali S. Nariman 
 
Investment Arbitration under the Spotlight  
- What next for Asia 
The topic chosen by the Organizers for the Herbert Smith 
Freehills Lecture 2014 – is: 
“Investment Arbitration under the Spotlight – 
what next for Asia? 
 
Let me assure you at the very start that International 
Investment Arbitration in Asia is alive and well, and also much 
in vogue around the world1.  The ‘Spotlight’ on it is only 
because it is under considerable stress: not at all surprising, 
since International Arbitration itself has never been too popular 
amongst nation-states around the world! 
 
Back in the year 1907 – more than 100 years ago – an 
outspoken American Lawyer, Elihu Root – who was also 
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Secretary of State to two U.S. Presidents – said (in a speech to 
the Arbitration and Peace Congress in New York):  
 (Quote) 
 “It has seemed to me that the great obstacle to the 
universal adoption of arbitration is not the unwillingness 
of civilised nations to submit their disputes to the decision 
of an impartial Tribunal.  It is the apprehension that the 
Tribunal selected will not be impartial.”2  
 
To me, this reads like a breath of fresh-air.  Nowadays, views 
are not expressed quite so candidly.  
 
In Paris, way back in 1983, at the 60th Anniversary celebrations 
of the ICC Court of International Arbitration, I was eye – 
witness to a clash between a distinguished proponent, and an 
equally distinguished opponent, of international arbitration.  
During one of the sessions, Judge Howard Holtzmann 
(Arbitrator Emeritus from the United States), confident that he 
was expressing a widely-accepted view, stressed the idea of 
Judge and Arbitrator being “partners in a system of 
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international justice”.  But Judge Keba Mbaye, (then President 
of the Supreme Court of Senagal, later a Judge of the 
International Court of Justice and also its President) differed.  
He said that “the notion that there is a system of International 
Justice will not be shared by some countries notably those in 
Africa, Asia and Latin America who still see arbitration as a 
‘foreign’ judicial institution imposed upon them”.  
 
Mbaye recalled the hostility of African Courts to arbitrators by 
foreign tribunals, and said: (I quote) 
“as everybody knows, arbitration is seldom freely agreed 
to by the developing countries.  It is often included in 
contracts of adhesion, the signature of which is essential 
to the survival of these countries”.3 
 
He also complained (at the time, a valid complaint) that 
developing countries were rarely the venue of an international 
arbitration, and, even more rarely, produced arbitrators.  
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Keba M’baye was a jurist – but he was a jurist with a vision.  At 
the Paris Conference he expressed the hope that “International 
Arbitration” would gradually gain third world acceptance – and 
ultimately secure third world confidence. 
 
As to third world acceptance of investment treaty-arbitration 
the process had started with efforts to have a multi-lateral 
treaty but this was not successful – because there was 
disagreement between capital-exporting states and capital – 
importing states as to the standards to be prescribed for 
treatment of foreign investors.  So, in the nineteen-sixties, 
capital-exporting states entered into investment treaties with 
individual capital-importing states: The era of Bilateral 
Investment Treaties had begun: treaties between two nation-
states that were dedicated to the promotion and protection of 
foreign investment (in the Host-State). 
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At about this time, there also came into existence and 
operation a World-Bank-sponsored International Convention – 
“the Washington Convention 1965 – on the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other 
States”.  This Convention provided a system for the settlement 
by conciliation and arbitration of investment disputes between a 
State party to the Convention and nationals of the Other State.  
When the Convention opened for signatures in the mid-1960s it 
was hailed as a great achievement of World Bank diplomacy.  
The Washington Convention put in place for the first time a 
general system of compulsory arbitration against Contracting 
States for all matters relating to international investments – at 
the instance of private actors in international economic 
relations.  Signatories to the Washington Convention 1965 now 
include – forty-six countries on this vast Asian Continent – of 
which thirty-five are not as yet ‘high-income’ (the World Bank 
criteria for ‘developed’ countries): 
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– only eleven are in that category.4 
 
By entering into a bilateral investment treaty, States act in their 
public international role as treaty-parties.  And by consenting, 
that disputes with investors of the Home-State will be 
determined by arbitration, the Host State accepts a process 
closely resembling international commercial arbitration, in 
which the Host State is cast as the only respondent in claims 
brought by the investor (of the Home State).”5 
 
BITs oblige governments to conduct their relations with foreign 
investors in a transparent fashion.  Some reciprocal if not 
identical obligations lie on the foreign investor, one of which is 
the obligation to make investments in accordance with the host 
State’s law.  As often observed in decisions of ICSID tribunals – 
7 
 
 
“respect for the integrity of the law of the host state is a critical 
part of international investment law”.6 
 
The most innovative aspect of a Bilateral Investment Treaty 
(BIT) is the opportunity it provides to investors of capital-
exporting states (the Home State) to directly enforce against 
the Host-State substantive rights in respect of investments 
made in it.  In addition, such Investors are also provided with 
an agreed forum to redress alleged wrongs: a forum for dispute 
resolution (by arbitration) that excludes the National Courts of 
the country where the investment is made – foreign investors 
having little or no confidence in the Courts of the Host-State.7 
 
Judge Charles Brower (alongwith Richard Lillich) find this not at 
all surprising.  In their Introduction to a book (containing 
articles) titled: “International Arbitration in the 21st century”, 
they write that: 
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“parties to international transactions choose to arbitrate 
eventual disputes not because arbitration is simpler than 
litigation, not because arbitration is cheaper than 
litigation, not because arbitration is final and binding and 
therefore substantially unreviewable, not because 
arbitrators may have greater expertise than national 
judges.  They arbitrate simply because neither will suffer 
its rights and obligations to be determined by the other 
party’s state of nationality.  In a word “a distrust of 
national courts”.8     
 
 
For this reason – if for no other – The Washington Convention 
1965 (for Settlement of Investment Disputes between States 
and Nationals of other States) has been a great success – 159 
nation States around the world are now parties to it (including 
46 from the continent of Asia); equally successful has been that 
other multilateral International Convention – The New York 
Convention 1958 [the Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 1958] – to which 147 
countries around the world are now parties (including 21 from 
the continent of Asia). 
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Judge Keba M’baye’s hope expressed at the 60th Anniversary 
celebrations of the ICC, in Paris, has been fulfilled – at least in 
part.  There is now third-world acceptance of international 
(investment) arbitration.  
But, international investment arbitration has not – not as yet – 
gained third-world9 confidence; and there are critics from the 
First World as well!  Their criticisms are documented and are in 
the public domain:- 
 
(1) First: Kluwer Law International gathered together and 
published, in the year 2010, a series of articles critical of 
international investment arbitration in a book titled “The 
Backlash Against Investment Arbitration – Perceptions 
and Realities”: In the Foreword it is mentioned that 
“States receiving investments are now rethinking the 
costs and the benefits they derive from these 
arrangements”. 
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(2) Second: on 31-08-2010 – nearly 50 professors of 
international law and economics – (many from the First 
World10) issued a ‘Public Statement’ – expressing views 
that were not at all flattering to the Bilateral-Investment 
Treaty regime11.  It said: 
(i) that investment treaty arbitration as currently 
constituted was not a fair, balanced or independent 
method for the resolution of investment disputes, 
and should not be relied on for this purpose. 
 
(ii) that there were strong moral as well as policy 
considerations for governments to withdraw from 
investment treaties and to oppose investor-state 
arbitration; and  
 
(iii) that Investment contracts (not investments treaties) 
should be the preferred choice since: (as the Public 
Statement put it): “they allow for greater care to be 
taken and greater certainty to be achieved in the 
framing of the parties’ legal rights and obligations”. 
 
(3) Third: Just two years after the Public Statement of 2010, 
more than a hundred lawyers in countries around Asia 
and the Pacific Region addressed an open-letter (in May 
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2012)12 to those who were negotiating the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP)13 (the TPP is still under negotiation 
today!).  The letter urged the rejection of investor-state 
dispute settlement: BECAUSE: 
(i) foreign investor protection under Bilateral 
Investment Treaties and their enforcement through 
investor-state arbitrations undermines the justice 
system in various countries; 
 
(ii) all investors, regardless of nationality, must have 
access to an open and independent judicial system 
for the resolution of disputes, including disputes 
with the State Government;  
 
(iii) in decisions issued under the present system 
foreign investors are increasingly granted more 
rights than are provided to domestic firms as well 
as investors under the Host State’s Constitution and 
court system; 
 
(iv) members of Arbitral Tribunals permit (or turn a 
blind eye to) lawyers who rotate roles: at times as 
arbitrators and at times as advocates for investors – 
in a manner that would be totally unethical for 
Judges; and 
 
 
The letter concluded that investment arbitration, as 
currently constituted, was not a fair, independent, and 
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balanced method for the resolution of disputes between 
sovereign nations and private investors. 
 
(4) Fourth: After the academics, and the men and women of 
the law and in public service have spoken, the journalists 
too have had their say!  The prestigious weekly ‘the 
ECONOMIST’, in one of its latest issues (of October 11, 
2014), characterised the Investor-State-Dispute 
Settlement Regime (ISDS) as “The Arbitration-Game”.  It 
offered the following comments, in spiced but dignified 
journalese: viz.  
- “that, the first Investor State Dispute Settlement 
(treaty) between Germany and Pakistan in 1959 
was to encourage foreign investment by protecting 
investors from discrimination or expropriation, but 
(as ECONOMIST then adds): “the implementation of 
this laudable idea has been disastrous”.  
 
- that Multinationals have exploited woolly definitions 
of “expropriation” to claim compensation for 
changes in government policy that happen to have 
harmed their business.  
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- that the rise in contentious arbitrations is only 
because companies or corporations have now learnt 
how to exploit arbitral clauses, even going as far as 
buying-off firms in jurisdictions where they do not 
operate, only to gain access to them! 
 
- that the secretive nature of the arbitration process 
and the lack of any requirement to consider 
precedent, allows plenty of scope for (what the 
ECONOMIST calls) – “creative adjudications”.  
 
 
 
Strong words – some harsh words – but as Keynes (John 
Maynard Keynes the greatest English Economist of the 20th 
century) famously said: “words ought to be a little harsh 
because they are an assault on the thoughts of the 
unthinking”.14 
 
Is all this criticism valid?  Are these onslaughts on the 
“thoughts of the unthinking” justified?  
 
International Arbitrators, including those in the Bradman Class, 
would not agree.  They would say that the entire tribe of 
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lawyers, law Professors, academics and irate members of the 
public (and now, even journalists) are hopelessly ill-informed.  
That may well be.  But I would respectfully point out that when 
one is considering whether awards that emanate from arbitral 
tribunals (ICSID, UNCITRAL, ad hoc or any other) are fair, 
balanced and accurate, one does not go to members of these 
bodies for a dispassionate assessment!  It would be a bit like 
asking Sitting Judges of a Court as to what their views are on 
the speed, reliability and efficiency of the Justice System that 
they administer – No – you have to ask the outsider – and 
those outside arbitral halls appear not to be too enthused with 
the manner in which investment disputes are being currently 
resolved. 
 
That the widespread criticisms are not all that ill-informed or 
exaggerated is established by the 2013/2014 Official Reports of 
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
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(UNCTAD).15  In these Reports are listed (what are 
characterised as) “systemic deficiencies” in the Investment 
Treaty Regime:– 
- First (and perhaps the most important) that “there 
is no possibility of erroneous decisions of the 
arbitral tribunal being corrected on a review”; 
 
- Second, that Foreign Investors have used investor-
State dispute settlement claims to challenge 
measures adopted by the host-State even when 
they are in public interest; 
 
- Third, that findings in arbitral decisions are 
inconsistent - with divergent legal interpretations of 
identical or similar treaty provisions; 
 
- Fourth, that there is grave concern about the 
independence and impartiality of arbitrators: and 
the increasing number of challenges to arbitrators 
indicates that disputing parties perceive them as 
biased, or pre-disposed to a particular pre-
conceived point of view; 
 
- Fifth, that the actual practice of the investor-State 
dispute system has put in doubt the oft-quoted 
notion that arbitration represents a speedy and low-
cost method of dispute resolution; 
 
- Sixth, that arbitrations – go on far too long – many 
of  which take several years to conclude; and 
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- Seventh, that large and prosperous law-firms 
dominate international investment arbitrations – 
charging high fees and employing expensive 
litigation-techniques: their representatives also 
indulge in burdensome and excessive document-
discovery and long arguments. 
 
UNCTAD has recommended: 
- introducing an Appeals facility and creating a 
Standing International Investment Court: which is 
definitely needed, but at the present time, there is 
no institution having authority to create it; 
 
UNCTAD has also suggested: 
 
-  that it should be made compulsory for investors to 
“exhaust local remedies” before resorting to 
international arbitration; but the suggestion 
undermines what Lilich and Brower have confirmed: 
viz. that investors (of the Home-State) have no 
trust in the National Courts of the Host State. 
 
Even with the SPOTLIGHT on defects and deficiencies, the 
‘Arbitration Game’ (as the ECONOMIST has described it) goes 
on, with the same vigour as trans-national trade.   BITs, which 
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originated in the year 1959, have now proliferated.  And there 
is no going back. 
 
The question is whether the investment treaty regime can be 
improved?  I believe it can.  My SUGGESTIONS are: 
 
SUGGESTION-I – Clauses in BITs must not be simply 
replicated from some Model – generally offered by the 
Home State.  They must be seriously negotiated at 
arms’ length between the two States: (the Home State 
and the Host State): and when necessary, with the 
assistance of those competent and familiar with treaty 
– making. 
 
Until the end of the year 2013 (for which data is available) it is 
estimated that there are now in operation a little over 3000 
Bilateral Investment Treaties (which includes IIAs – 
International Investment Agreements as well) – Some of them 
are tailor-made or custom-built – entered into after prolonged 
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negotiations – but most of them are ‘copy-cat’16 agreements-
adopting (often without even adapting) Clauses from one or 
another of some ‘Model BIT’: under- developed and developing 
States have simply surrendered to developed countries and 
their coterie of lawyers, the all-important task of drafting 
relevant and mutually acceptable clauses in a BIT, with the 
result that: most of the BITs current today contain Clauses 
favouring investors, with little or no safeguards for the Host 
State – the State that is in need of foreign-investment.  For 
instance, I have not read a single BIT between States that 
ensures an agreed or minimum quantum of investment to be 
made by investors of the Home State in return for the ample 
set of protections that are offered to them in various standard 
clauses of a bilateral investment treaty.  Again, there are few 
BITs that attempt to define broad and imprecise expressions 
(expressions that recur in every BIT: “fair and equitable 
treatment”; “full protection and security”; “most favoured 
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nation”; “national treatment”; “expropriation”); the response to 
this comment has been that arbitral decisions interpreting these 
clauses have helped to establish a jurisprudence constante (a 
phrase – in French – meaning an unbroken line of precedent).  
I do not agree.  I suggest that the more apposite expression (in 
French) would be “Jurisprudence flottante” (meaning an 
uncertain line of precedent!).  Because differently constituted 
arbitral tribunals have been interpreting (differently), broadly-
worded but standard expressions used in BITs17: leaving users 
of investment arbitration perplexed and confused. 
 
Prof. Sonarajah of Singapore (an outspoken critic of investment 
treaty arbitration) has said that BITs between the developed 
States on the one hand and least-developed and developing-
States on the other (within the continent of Asia as well as 
outside) – are to be characterised by two contrasting words: 
“NEED” and “GREED”: the need of the Host-State for an 
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investment and the greed of the investor (of the Home State) 
to take an unfair advantage of the Host State18.  But if what 
Prof. Sonarajah has said sounds offensive, there is a sentence 
from a 2008 UN document19 that is less so.  It reads: 
 
“If countries are unable to properly understand and 
assess the content of the agreements to which they have 
agreed to because of their complexity, the risk arises that 
they will enter into agreements that they are unprepared 
to honour fully....” (unquote) 
 
There, we have encapsulated in U.N. language, the fate of BITs 
that are not mutually negotiated, but all-too-frequently signed 
on the dotted line by the Host State.  Complexities in them 
(vague and indeterminate words) are (often) not even 
comprehended by officials in the least developed and/or 
developing nations.  Host States simply put their signature 
because the investment is needed, and little or no thought is 
given about the consequences: until something, hits the Host 
State (like a meteor): viz. a claim under international law either 
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for “expropriation” or for “ denial-of-justice”, the quantum of 
damages claimed often being far in excess of the Host State’s 
annual budget! 
 
States do not act rationally when they enter into investment 
treaties20.  I recall an International Treaty-Arbitration case – 
ICSID Case No. ARB/04/14 – Wintershall Aktiengesellschaft vs. 
Argentine Republic21 where, sitting on an ICSID Arbitral 
Tribunal (with distinguished colleagues Professor Piero 
Bernardini and Dr. Santiago Torres Bernardez) we heard the 
oral evidence of Professor Christoph Schreuer – Professor of 
International Law and author of that famous book containing a 
commentary on the ICSID Convention.  This is what Schreuer 
said to us (in the year 2007): 
“[....] many times, in fact in the majority of times, BITs 
are among clauses of treaties that are not properly 
negotiated.  BITs are very often pulled out of a drawer, 
often on the basis of some sort of a model, and are put 
forward on the occasion of state visits when heads of 
states need something to sign, and the typical two 
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candidates in a situation like that are Bilateral Investment 
Treaties, and treaties for cultural co-operation.  In other 
words, they are very often not negotiated at all, they are 
just being put on the table, and I have heard several 
representatives who have actually been active in this 
Treaty-making process, (if you can call it that), say that, 
‘We had no idea that this would have real consequences 
in the real world’.”22 
 
Just a year before – in 2006 – Pakistan’s then-Attorney General 
Mr. Makhdoom Khan, had informed a gathering of investment-
arbitration specialists in Washington that such treaties (i.e. 
BITs) were for – long viewed (in his country) as “photo-op 
agreements” – something that governments would sign with 
visiting foreign dignitaries so as to provide an excuse for a 
photo opportunity!  “These [treaties] are signed without any 
knowledge of their implications”, he said.  “And only when you 
are hit by the first investor-state arbitration do you realize what 
these words mean”!23 
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All of this helps to highlight another grave defect in the current 
investment treaty regime – the absence of a level playing field 
– if and when the investment sours; inevitably, there is (on the 
one side) an investor of the developed country (Home State) – 
generally a large corporate entity well-stocked with legal talent 
and expertise – and on the other side the developing country 
(Host State – where the investment is made) – not half-so-well-
equipped: which leads to my second suggestion. 
 
SUGGESTION-II – The absence of a level playing field 
dis-ables the developing Host-State from making an 
effective defence to an investors’ claims in arbitration: 
Even if the BIT as signed ensures more protection to 
investors in the Host State without any (or hardly any) 
compensating safeguards for the latter, when a dispute 
arises, efforts must be made to establish Equality in 
Arbitration. 
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In an article by Eric Gottwald published in American University 
International Law Review (2007)24 the author says:   
 “In the last five years, there has been an explosion in the 
number of investment treaty arbitration claims filed 
against developing nations, challenging a wide array of 
sensitive government regulations and routinely seeking 
millions and even billions of dollars in damages.  
Mounting an effective defense to these claims is essential 
for a developing nation, as even a single successful 
investor claim could wreak havoc on its economy, weaken 
its capacity to regulate in the public interest, and damage 
its reputation as a desirable investment location.” 
 
The author cites the instance of an investment arbitration 
between a giant Corporation on the one hand and a small 
almost insignificant Host State on the other.  It makes pathetic 
reading!  These are the facts (as stated by Gottwald): an ICSID 
arbitration was commenced by the Commonwealth 
Development Corporation (CDC) – a large U.K. owned 
development finance company – against the Republic of 
Seychelles, a small Island State (having a population of only 
eighty thousand people); CDC was represented by a team of 
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lawyers from Allen & Overy, a major international law firm in 
London with a speciality practice in investor-state arbitration; 
On the other side, the Republic of Seychelles was represented 
by its Attorney-General Mr. Anthony Fernando.  The Republic of 
Seychelles had never been sued by a foreign investor before, 
and Mr. Fernando had no prior experience litigating ICSID or 
other investor-state claims.  His office had an unreliable 
internet connection, no access to Westlaw or Lexis-Nexis, and 
no treatises or books on ICSID or investment arbitration.  Some 
international law-firms who had been approached to represent 
the Republic of Seychelles in the arbitration told Mr. Fernando 
that they would charge $600 per hour per lawyer; if they had 
been engaged, their fees would have emptied his office budget 
in a few weeks – and possibly exhausted the entire budget of 
the State in a few months!  Ultimately poor Mr. Fernando – a 
civil lawyer whose daily work, involved criminal, constitutional 
and administrative law – bravely (but unsuccessfully) defended 
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the Republic in an international investment arbitration case 
“armed only with his wits and a copy of the ICSID Convention 
and Rules!”  The (Sole) Arbitrator found that Seychelles had no 
valid defence to CDC’s claims under UK Contract law; and 
awarded CDC, the total amount claimed with interest 
amounting to about £ 2.4 million along with £ 100,000 as costs.  
Seychelles filed an application for annulment of the ICSID 
Award under Article 52(1) of the Washington Convention, but 
the Annulment Committee rejected all three of the Republic’s 
grounds for annulment as “lacking in merit”; and even though 
the Annulment Committee observed that it was “not insensitive 
to the fiscal circumstances of the Republic” (which it described 
as “impecunious”), it went on to say “that it felt compelled to 
require that CDC receive” (in addition to the amounts already 
awarded), a further sum of £ 83,345.61 for CDC’s legal 
expenses and costs incurred in connection with the annulment 
proceeding! – Gottwald describes this as “an alarming 
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illustration of how smaller developing nations who cannot 
afford counsel may defend themselves without access to basic 
legal authority with potentially disastrous results”.  I think it 
also illustrates the lack of appreciation on the part of the Host-
State of the weaknesses in its own case – with more competent 
legal assistance: and by possibly making an offer of settlement, 
the Government of Seychelles could have avoided what was 
certainly an expensive and ruinous arbitration! 
 
However, I endorse Gottwald’s comment that the Seychelles 
case does call for some effective response – such as the 
establishment of a regional legal assistance centre in Asia, 
which, if set up would bolster the legitimacy of investment 
treaty arbitration by providing developing nations with an 
alternative low-cost option of getting expert assistance: It could 
then get better prepared when its Counsel would be able to 
make more cogent legal arguments, which would, in turn 
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produce an award that was better informed.  “By ensuring that 
developing nations (in Asia and elsewhere) have affordable 
access to legal authorities and expertise, investment treaty 
arbitration will (then) more perfectly fulfil its mission of 
providing a truly neutral and just form of dispute settlement”: 
(sic) – at present however it does not; which takes me to the 
next suggestion. 
 
SUGGESTION-III:  Exploding the myth about the 
infallibility of International Arbitral Tribunals; Is it at all 
possible to ensure that arbitral awards in international 
investment arbitration are just and fair? 
 
In most professions, the possibility of occasional error is frankly 
admitted and even guarded against – more so, in Court 
systems which prescribe, a succession of appeals.  But 
International Commercial Arbitration (prevalent for many 
decades now) – and International Investment Arbitration (a 
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more recent phenomenon) – proceed on the questionable 
premise that although Courts may err (and frequently do), an 
International Arbitral Tribunal can never (or hardly ever) be 
wrong: which is reminiscent of that supreme sense of 
complacency exemplified in a remark of the then Chief Justice 
of England at a Lord Mayor’s Banquet, way back in 1936.  Lord 
Hewart had then said (somewhat pompously): 
 
“His Majesty’s judges are supremely satisfied with the 
almost universal admiration in which they are held”. 
 
Substitute “International arbitrators” for “His Majesty’s judges” 
and you will get the current view of Arbitrators on Arbitrators! 
But don’t let us stop there. 
 
Here is what David Pannick says.  Pannick has written a book 
(on “Judges”)25 which is controversial but entertaining.  After 
quoting Hewart, he says that it is difficult to believe that “the 
universal admiration” reflected the true feelings of many of the 
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customers of Hewart’s own Court.  What then about the 
customers of Investment Arbitral Tribunals around the world?  I 
suggest that if there is a study on this, the results may not be 
too flattering. 
 
If judges are fallible, arbitrators are not less so.  We all have 
our stories of ‘bad judgments’, and we keep unfolding them – 
but in charming cover-ups: Professor Goodhart was Editor of 
the Law Quarterly Review for fifty long years.  On his 
retirement, Lord Diplock wrote a commemorative little piece.  
He said that he always thought that Professor Goodhart was on 
his side, because whenever his (Diplock’s) judgment was 
commented on (by Goodhart) in the LQR the remarks were 
always prefaced with the words: “with greatest respect”.  
Diplock thought: “Ah, this is great: it must be because we 
belonged to the same University”.  But then Goodhart had let it 
be known how he had learned the ‘props’, of-how-to-criticise-a 
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judgment-without-appearing-to-be-offensive – it was from Sir 
Fredrick Pollock.  Pollock had said: 
-  If you are doubtful whether the judicial reasoning is 
wholly unassailable you preface your comment on the 
judgment with the words: “with respect”; 
- If the judgment is obviously, wrong you substitute “with 
great respect”; 
- But if it is one of those judgments that have to be seen to 
be believed, then the formula is “but with the greatest 
respect”! 
 
I have known of arbitral awards that have to be seen to be 
believed.  (Of course, such awards are never mine.  They are 
never yours – they are always someone else’s!)  In 1983, at the 
celebration of the 60th Anniversary of the ICC Court of 
International Arbitration Professor Pierre Lalive described them 
as “lawless awards”.  Even if their number is not large, I 
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suggest that we should hear more about them, speak and write 
more about them – and much more frequently; if necessary – 
and only if necessary! – with the greatest respect! 
 
Of course, as with international cricket umpires, life is getting 
more and more difficult for arbitrators in international 
investment arbitration: their decisions are not only in the public 
domain, they are published, talked about and criticised.  The 
mistakes of cricket umpires are now exposed to the cruel gaze 
of millions of television viewers – with the help of an advanced 
digital computer-system known as Hawkeye: (a system based 
on technology used in brain surgery), a system which now 
claims, definitively and accurately, to answer the question: 
 
“Would the ball have hit the wickets if it had missed the 
batsman’s pads?” 
 
In the next decade or so, I fervently hope that we have some 
sort of technological benchmark with reference to which awards 
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in international investment arbitrations can be graded for their 
rationality, fairness and justness!  But what till then?: which 
takes me to my next suggestion. 
 
SUGGESTION-IV:– Since an Award rendered by an 
international investment arbitral tribunal is final and 
binding, and since recourse against it (on merits) is not 
presently available in Courts of law (either under the 
New York Convention or UNCITRAL or ICSID), there is a 
felt need for provision being made in the Treaty (BIT) 
itself for an agreed internal mechanism: to enable the 
arbitral tribunal to review its own award – at the 
instance of a party aggrieved – for the correction of 
obvious and patent errors. 
 
After observing that “arbitration-without-privity is a delicate 
mechanism”, Arbitrator-Emeritus Jan Paulsson warned that: 
“A single incident of an adventurist arbitrator going 
beyond the proper scope of his jurisdiction in a sensitive 
case may be sufficient to generate a backlash.”26 
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One such “backlash” occurred in India in 2011 with the making 
of an Award (of 30th November 2011) by an Arbitral Tribunal 
appointed under the Australia-India Bilateral Investment Treaty 
dated (of 26-02-1999).  It was as a direct consequence of this 
award (against the Government of India) that India was 
compelled to make payment of 4.08 million Australian Dollars to 
a corporate investor from Australia (White Industries Ltd., 
Australia) – along with a further sum of 4.25 million Australian 
Dollars by way of interest – under international law – for 
“undue delays in dealing with White Industries’ jurisdictional 
claim for over nine years, and India’s Supreme Court’s inability 
to hear White Industries jurisdictional appeal for over five 
years” (sic) – even though the BIT of 26th February, 1999 had 
acknowledged that “effective means of asserting claims and 
enforcing rights” and “ensuring to investors the right of access 
to its Courts of justice” would be in accordance with the 
applicable laws of the Host-State, and that investments of 
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investors (of the Home-State) “would be made within the 
framework of laws” of the Host-State).  The laws of the Host-
State (India) did not and do not enable litigants (Indian or 
foreign) to claim damages for inordinate delays in the hearing / 
disposal of their cases in Courts.  The only remedy under 
Indian law (for unreasonable or inordinate delays of cases in 
Courts) is the Court’s power to award interest pendente lite on 
the principal sum awarded, when finally decreed.27 
 
It was also as a result of this award (of 30-11-2011) that the 
Government of India decided to suspend entering into fresh 
Bilateral Investment Treaties with other States. 
 
Now BITs are international-law-instruments governed by the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: which provides that 
treaties between States are governed by international law and 
are to be interpreted in the light of any relevant rules of 
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international law applicable (Article 2(i)(a) and Article 
31(iii)(c)).  But this does not mean that international law 
trumps national law – whatever be the terms of the treaty 
(BIT); to treat international law as a self-sufficient legal order 
in the sphere of foreign investment is plainly untenable.28  With 
the internationalisation of investment relations there is no 
denationalisation of legal relations established by foreign 
investments; the national law of the host-state is neither 
irrelevant nor inapplicable; hence, international arbitrators have 
an obligation to consider national laws of the host-state where 
the Treaty so provides: subject only to the host-state not being 
permitted to rely on its internal laws to derogate from or 
modify its Treaty obligations.29  The question of whether a state 
(host-state) has acted in a manner inconsistent with its 
obligation under the Treaty cannot be decided without an 
investigation into the national law of the state.  What happened 
in the White Industries Arbitration was that the arbitral tribunal 
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in its operative decision (final award dated 30th November 
2011) – and without any investigation into the national law of 
the Host-State (India) – ordered and declared that the Republic 
of India had breached its obligation (under international law) to 
provide “effective means of asserting claims and enforcing 
rights” with respect to White Industries Australia Ltd’s 
investment, “pursuant to Article 4(2) of the India-Australia BIT 
incorporating Article 4(5) of the India Kuwait BIT”, and 
proceeded to award damages to White Industries in the sums 
already mentioned. 
 
Now Article 4 (2) of the BIT (dated February 26, 1999) 
between the Government of Australia and the Republic of India 
has set out the most-favoured-nation clause; it reads: 
“4(2) A Contracting Party (India) shall at all times treat 
investments in its own territory on a basis no less 
favourable than that accorded to investments of investors 
of any third country.” 
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And Article 4 (5) of the India-Kuwait BIT (dated 27-11-2001) – 
(rightly) relied upon by the Tribunal as having been 
incorporated in the India-Australia Treaty – read: 
“4(5) Each Contracting State shall maintain a favourable 
environment for investments in its territory by investors 
of the other Contracting State.  Each Contracting State 
shall in accordance with its applicable laws and 
regulations provide effective means of asserting claims 
and enforcing rights with respect to investments and 
ensure to investors of the other Contracting State, the 
right of access to its courts of justice, administrative 
tribunals and agencies, and all other bodies exercising 
adjudicatory authority, and the right to employ persons of 
their choice, for the purpose of the assertion of claims 
and the enforcement of rights with respect of their 
investments.” 
 
Under international law unreasonable delays in civil proceedings 
in Courts in which the foreigner is endeavouring to vindicate a 
right may amount to a denial of justice necessitating the award 
of damages to the claimant as an appropriate remedy.30  
Invoking this principle, the Arbitral Tribunal in the White 
Industries case granted relief for the inordinate delay in the 
disposal of White Industries’ jurisdictional application and 
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appeal in Indian Courts (including in the Supreme Court of 
India) – but overlooked or ignored (and did not even explain 
why it overlooked or ignored) the italicised portion in Article 
4(5) of the India-Kuwait BIT (quoted above): which mandated 
the Tribunal to apply Indian law; under India’s legal system 
established under India’s written Constitution there is no right 
or cause of action for any litigant to claim damages for delays 
in the hearing of cases in Courts. 
 
There is another and a yet more startling error in the arbitral 
award dated 30th November, 2011.  The award in the White-
Industries- Arbitration had referred to and relied on an earlier 
award (dated 30th March, 2010) rendered by another arbitral 
Tribunal under another treaty (the USA-Ecuador BIT) – 
between Chevron Corporation (USA) & Texaco Petroleum 
Company (USA) and the Republic of Ecuador – in which it had 
been held that excessive delays in disposing of proceedings (in 
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Ecuador’s national Courts) amounted to a denial of justice 
under international law, and so proceeded to award damages 
to Chevron.  In the White Industries Arbitration, the Arbitral 
Tribunal relied on this finding (made in the Chevron award) as 
a precedent stating that the Article II(7) of the Treaty between 
the United States of America and the Republic of Ecuador 
“employs almost identical wording to that found in Article 4(5) 
of the India-Kuwait BIT”: another most egregious mistake.  
Article II(7) of the Treaty between the USA and the Republic of 
Ecuador is not at all “identically” worded as Article 4(5) of the 
India-Kuwait BIT.  It read as follows: 
“II(7) Each party shall provide effective means of 
asserting claims and enforcing rights with respect to 
investment, investment agreements, and investment 
authorisations.” 
 
The words in “accordance with its (i.e. Ecuador’s) applicable 
laws and regulations” are absent.  And yet the award dated 30-
11-2011 assumed that Clause 4(5) of the India-Kuwait BIT was 
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identically worded as in the Treaty between the USA and 
Ecuador!  Was this inadvertently stated, or was it deliberate 
(for some good but undisclosed reason!)?  We shall never 
know.  An international investment arbitral award once made is 
beyond recall by the arbitral tribunal that made it.  It is 
imperative that a provision be made in the BIT itself, that a 
party aggrieved is entitled to bring to the notice of the 
arbitrators (or the arbitral tribunal) – within a stated period of 
time after the award is made – a patent or apparent error to 
enable the arbitral tribunal to correct the same, or to explain 
why there is no apparent or patent error.  It is the lack of such 
a provision in the Australia-India BIT that led to the disastrous 
consequence of India having had to opt out of the 
international-investment-arbitration regime. 
 
SUGGESTION-V – There is need for far greater 
accountability in the Investor-State arbitration system: 
 
42 
 
 
The most critical factor in investment arbitration is the integrity 
of the arbitrator.  As to how Arbitrators or the Chairman of an 
Arbitral Tribunal should be chosen is crucial – but (as the 
hackneyed phrase goes) the jury is still out, as to how this can 
be ensured.  Egalitarian trends are the order of the day!  And 
the trend today is for an increasing number of arbitrators from 
different countries around the world to be appointed (as 
Arbitrator or as Chairman-of-Tribunal), which it is hoped would 
help build Third World confidence in International Investment 
Arbitration!  But the persons so appointed (whether from the 
First World or the Third World or partly from one and partly 
from the other) must be extremely proficient, knowledgeable 
and competent – apart from possessing the highest integrity.  
My esteemed friend Jan Paulsson – once spoke on Ethics and 
Elitism in Arbitration.  He said to his audience that it was a 
mistake to think that it was a good thing for the international 
arbitral process if the greatest number of persons possible had 
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the opportunity to act as Arbitrators; and he ventured to 
suggest that given the high stakes and great sensitivities 
involved in all types of international arbitration, there was a 
good case for supporting the emergence and recognition of an 
elite corps of international arbitrators.  Individual reputation, in 
this field (Paulsson went on to explain) grows by slow accretion 
of evidence of independence and fair mindedness in numerous 
instances, and the building of reputation is a lengthy process, 
which offers no assurance of success, but it does create a 
depth of confidence which can never be achieved by self-
serving arbitral declarations of independence and impartiality. 
But alas, the speech was not at all at all well-received!  When 
sending me the text of his speech, Jan Paulsson wrote in the 
margin: “Fali – have you ever been jeered at the end of a 
speech?  I have – and if you read the following pages you will 
see why”!) 
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I submit that the present system of challenge (under applicable 
arbitral rules or ad hoc practice) to the independence or 
impartiality of an Arbitrator (or of the Chairman of an Arbitral 
Tribunal) – elitist or otherwise – is far too liberal.  It favours the 
Arbitrator/Chairman whose appointment is sought to be 
challenged.  It is just not possible to get rid of an appointed 
Arbitrator (or Chairman of the Arbitral Tribunal) because of 
some information in the possession of the challenging party –
which (for want of proof) cannot be revealed!  At present there 
has to be disclosed some ‘good reason’ that the person already 
appointed is not likely to be impartial – a herculean task! 
 
It is heartening to find that challenges to appointed arbitrators 
under the ICSID regime in the last two years have been far 
more successful than in the past.  In three very recently 
decided cases – decided by the Chairman of ICSID – in Blue 
Bank International & Trusts (Barbados) vs. Bolivarian Republic 
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of Venezuela31 (‘Blue Bank’), Burlington Resources Inc. Vs. 
Republic of Ecuador32 (‘Burlington’) and in Caratube 
International Oil C LLP vs. Republic of Kazakhstan33 (‘Caratube’) 
– in each of these cases - challenges to the independence of 
the arbitrators succeeded by applying a lower standard than in 
the past – a standard of ‘reasonable doubt’ – not that of ‘high 
probability’.  Dr. Sam Luttrell in his article in the 15th 
Anniversary Issue of the Asian Dispute Review (October 2014)34 
concludes that “it seems reasonable to surmise that the return 
to a lower standard (of ‘reasonable doubt’) as the threshold for 
disqualification is an institutional reaction to what are, at their 
core, calls for greater accountability in the Investor-State 
arbitration system.”   
 
We definitely need more calls for greater accountability in the 
investor – state arbitration system! 
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What next for Asia? 
First, some statistical information: the various countries in Asia 
that have entered into Bilateral Investment Treaties (together 
with their numbers) and a list of Asian countries that have filed 
Investment Treaty claims for adjudication (in Arbitration) 
together with their number, are enumerated and set out in the 
end note.35. 
Current trends in International Investment Arbitration (around 
the world) are somewhat confusing.  UNCTAD World 
Investment Reports describe the years 2013 and 2014 as 
“years of disengaging and upscaling”:  
- “disengaging” as instanced by the premature 
termination of several Bilateral Investment Treaties: 
 
- (In Asia), the Republic of India has suspended 
entering into fresh BITs from the year 2012: on account 
of an arbitral award (UNCITRAL) in the case of White 
Industries Australia Ltd v. The Republic of India which 
though honoured and paid up in full, suffered from an 
egregious error – viz. applying international law to an 
aspect which the treaty expressly provided had to be 
determined by the law of the Host-State (India). 
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- Indonesia has given notice of termination of its BITs 
with the Netherlands; 
 
- (In Australasia) the Australian Government (prior to 
the 2014 elections) had announced the discontinuance of 
Investor State - dispute settlement with developing 
countries.  
 
- (In Africa) South Africa has given notice of 
termination of its BITs with Germany, the Netherlands, 
Spain and Switzerland; 
 
- (In Europe) The Parliament in the Netherlands has 
recently adopted a resolution criticising Investor – State 
Dispute Settlement;  
 
- (In South America): the Republic of Ecuador has 
terminated 13 of its BITs in the year 2013, the Republic 
of Venezuela having done so a year earlier whilst 
simultaneously denouncing the ICSID Convention (!); 
Ecuador and Bolivia have also withdrawn from the ICSID 
Convention in the year 2007/2009; 
 
- upscaling”: by adding in the year 2013 - 44 new 
International Investment Agreements (30 BITs and 14 
IIAs) to those already existing, bringing the aggregate 
total number of International Investment Agreement – 
including BITs – to 3236 by the end of December 2013.36  
 
And so, it appears to me that What’s Next for Asia is precisely 
what doctors used to prescribe (to all and Sundry) for a host of 
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petty illnesses way back in the nineteen-thirties and nineteen-
forties: the prescription would read: MIXTURE AS BEFORE.  For 
What’s Next in Investment Treaty Arbitration in Asia – the 
answer is: MIXTURE AS BEFORE.  The investment arbitral world 
will not come to a grinding halt merely because of defects and 
deficiencies in the investment treaty regime, neither in Asia nor 
in any other Continent.  BITs will continue to be entered into - 
with or without mutually negotiated clauses.  And BITs already 
signed may possibly at some future time get “unsigned”: when 
the Host-State (that signed them) chooses to withdraw from 
the BIT regime.37 
 
And this is how – ladies and gentlemen – this Lecture ends – 
“not with a bang but a whimper!”38 
                                          
1 The World Investment Forum held its annual meeting in Geneva, just three 
weeks ago (14-16th October, 2014).  One of the subjects discussed was 
“Reforming the Investment Agreement Regime:” the meeting took stock of 60 
years of investment policy-making and means for improving International 
Investment Agreements (IIAs).  Countries in Asia also participated (Bangladesh, 
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China, India and Mongolia); their representatives commented on the need for 
improvements (reported on the conference website). 
2 Comments by Elihu Root, Sen. Doc. 444, 60th Cong. 1st Sess. 10-11, 12; 1907, 
1133, 1135.  
3 See “The Flame Rekindled” (New Hopes for International Arbitration) edited by 
Sam Muller and Wim Mijs published by Martinus Nijhoff Netherlands (1994) at 
page 134.  
4 35 developing countries in Asia are: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, 
Cambodia, China, East Timor, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kazakhstan, 
North Korea, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Lebanon, Malaysia, Maldives, Mangolia, 
Myanmar, Nepal, Oman, Pakistan, Philippines, Russia, SaudiArabia, Syria, Sri 
Lanka, Tajakistan, Thailand, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, Yemen. 
11  high-income countries in Asia are: Bahrain, Brunei, Hong Kong, Israel, Japan, 
South Korea, Kuwait, Qatar, Singapore, Taiwan and United Arab Emirates. 
5 See Anthea Roberts in an article and in Vol. 104 American Journal of 
International Law (April 2010) at page 182.  
6 For instance – Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Services Worldwide vs. Republic of 
Philippines (ICSID Case No. ARB/03/25) – Award dated 16th August, 2007 para 
402. 
7 This is in contrast to the provisions of the New York Convention on 
Enforcement of Arbitral Awards 1958 – which relies on national Courts to 
implement its provisions.  
8 “International Arbitration in the 21st century – Judicialisation and Uniformity?” 
(Co-edited Richard Lillich and Charles N. Brower – Transnational Publishers, 
1994).  
9 Due to the complex history of evolving meanings and contexts there is no clear 
or agreed-upon definition of the Third World.  The French anthropologist Sauvy, 
in an article in a French magazine in August 1952 had coined the term Third 
World preferring to countries that were not aligned with either the Communist 
Soviet block or the capitalist NATO block during the cold-war.  Sauvy wrote: ‘this 
third-world ignored, exploited, despised like the third-estate, also wants to be 
something”.  The term third-world is now used inter-changeably with least 
developed as well as developing countries.  
10 Concept of the First World originated during the Cold War involving countries 
that were aligned to the USA, UK and France. 
11 http://issuk.comembajadecuusa/docs/public_statement_final_dec_2013 
12 http://tpplegal.wordpress.com/open-letter 
13 Four original signatory’ countries to the TPP are Singapore, New Zealand, 
Brunei and Chile.  China and Korea have announced their interest in September 
2013.  The USA, Australia, Peru, Vietnam, Malaysia, Mexico, Canada and Japan 
are still negotiating.  
14 New Statesman and Nation (dated 15.07.1933).  
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15 http://unctad.org/en/publicationslibrary/wir2013_en.pdf; 
http://unctad.org/en/pages/PublicationWebflyer.aspx?publicationid=937  
16 “That closely imitates or mimics another”; “someone who copies the words or 
behavior of another”. 
17 For examples of Awards containing inconsistent interpretations of standard 
clauses in BITs see – (i) Lauder vs. Czech Republic – UNCITRAL London Award 
2001); CME vs. Czech Republic – Stockholm Award (2001); (ii)  SGS vs. Islamic 
Republic of Pakistan (ICSID Case No.2003); SGS vs. Republic of Philippines 
(ICSID 2004); (iii) S.D. Myers Inc vs. Canada (UNCITRAL 2000): Metalclad 
Corporation vs. United Mexican States (ICSID 2000); (iv) Pope and Talbot Inv. 
Vs. Canada (UNCITRAL 2000); Suez Inter Aguas v. Argentina (ICSID 2006); (v) 
Suez-Vivendi v. Argentina (2006): Vladimir Berchader v. Russian Federation 
(2006). 
18 A Law for Greed or a Law for Need?  The Current State of the International 
Law on Foreign Investment” (2006) 6 International Environmental Agreements 
pages 329 to 357 (Springer, 2006). 
19 UNCTAD International Investment Rule Making: stock taking Challenges and 
the Way Forward – UN Document 
UNCTAD/iit/2007/3/unsalesnumber.08.II.D.1(2008) – page 51. 
20 See 104 American Journal of International Law (2010) at page 186–f.n. 
21 Also mentioned in a very recent judgment of the US Supreme Court in B.G. 
Group PLC vs. Republic of Argentina 572 US 1 at p-7 (Judgment dated 5-3-
2014). 
22 Expert testimony from Christoph Schreuer, quoted in the Award dated 
December 8, 2008 in Wintershall Aktiengesellschaft v. Argentine Republic ICSID 
Arbitration para 85. 
23 Investment Treaty News April 2009 pages 3 and 4. 
24 “Levelling the Playing Field: Is it Time for a Legal Assistance Centre for 
Developing Nations in Investment Treaty Arbitration!”  American University 
International Law Review, (2007) Volume 22 Issue 2 Article 3. 
25 Oxford University Press 1988. 
26 See “Arbitration Without Privity”, Jan Paulsson, ICSID Review, Foreign 
Investment Law Journal, Vol. 10, Number 2, Fall 1995 page 232 at page 257. 
27 White Industries Australia Ltd., had in its favour an ICC Award of the year 
2002 (in an international commercial arbitration); being a “foreign award” under 
Indian law, it sought to enforce this award by an application made in  the High 
Court of Delhi; the Respondent in the ICC Award was Coal India Ltd., an entity of 
the Government of India;  However, Coal India Ltd., had already filed (a few 
days earlier) an application in the High Court of Calcutta to set aside this ICC 
Award of 2002; White Industries then filed an application in the High Court of 
Calcutta contending that no Court in India, including the High Court of Calcutta, 
had any jurisdiction to set aside a foreign award – such an award under Indian 
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Law could only be enforced or (on very limited grounds) not enforced; it could 
not be set aside.  The Calcutta High Court dismissed the application of White 
Industries holding that on the basis of a decision of a Bench of three Judges of 
the Supreme Court of India (in Bhatia International – March 2002) the High 
Court Calcutta had undoubted jurisdiction to ‘set aside’ the ICC Award of 2002.  
White Industries then filed a jurisdictional Appeal in the Supreme Court of India 
(in July 2004) contending that Bhatia International was wrongly decided.  The 
Appeal was admitted but not heard for several years since Bhatia International 
could only be reconsidered (and if found erroneous, overruled) by a larger Bench 
of 5 Judges.  This did happen (i.e. overruling of Bhatia International), but only 
much later, when the crowded docket of Supreme Court permitted the setting up 
of a five judge bench: In Bharat Aluminium Co. vs. Kaiser Aluminium Technical 
Service, Inc. & Others (6th September, 2012) – reported 2012 (9) SCC 552 – 
after a long hearing Bhatia International was overruled: but only prospectively 
w.e.f 6-9-2012.  The net result was that White Industries’ jurisdictional appeal in 
the Supreme Court of India would have had to be dismissed in view of the 
judgment of the Bench of five Judges in Bharat Aluminium (which by its terms 
operated only prospectively), and the Calcutta High Court would then have had 
to decide whether or not, and on what grounds the ICC Award of 2002, even 
though a foreign award could be or was liable to be set aside in Indian courts.  
However in July 2010 White Industries had already filed a Notice of Arbitration 
under the Australia-India BIT invoking principles of international law and 
contending that the means of asserting claims or enforcing rights (guaranteed 
under the Australia-India BIT), in order to be effective could not be subjected to 
indefinite or undue delays, since in international law “undue delay in effect 
amounted to a denial of access to those means”.  This claim and contention was 
upheld in the arbitral award dated 30th November, 2011. 
28 The Hybrid Foundations of Investment Treaty Arbitration by Zachary Douglas, 
British Yearbook of International Law (2003) Vol. 74 (1) 151 at page 155.  
29 Antoine Goetz et al. Vs. The Republic of Burundi (ICSID Award dated 10th 
February, 1999) – reported in ICCA Yearbook 2001 Vol. XXVI page 24 at page 
31. 
30 “The International Responsibility of States for Denial of Justice” by Alwyn 
Freeman, Longman Green & Co., (1938) pages 257 to 262; and “Jan Paulsson 
Denial of Justice in International Law” (2005) Cambridge University Press, pages 
177-178 
31 ICSID Case No. ARB/12/20 – Decision on the Parties Proposals to Disqualify a 
Majority of the Tribunal (12th November 2013). 
32 ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5, Decision on the Proposal for Disqualification of 
Professor Francisco Orrego Vicuna (13th December 2013). 
33 ICSID Case No. ARB/13/13, Decision on the Proposal for Disqualification of Mr. 
Bruno Boeshch (20th March, 2014). 
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34 See – “Beware of Blue Bank: the Implications of a Lower Threshold for ICSID 
Arbitrator Disqualification for International Arbitration in Asia” by Dr. Sam 
Luttrell, 15th Anniversary issue of the Asian Dispute Review (Arbitration & ADR in 
Asia) October 2014 pages 172 to 178. 
35 What’s Happening in Asia is as follows: 
(1) Bangladesh has so far entered into 28 Bilateral Investment Treaties; and has 
filed one Investment Treaty Claim; (2) Cambodia has so far entered into 21 
Bilateral Investment Treaties; and has filed one Investment Treaty claim; (3) 
China has so far entered into 131 Bilateral Investment Treaties; and has filed 
one Investment Treaty claim; (4) Hong Kong has so far entered into 16 Bilateral 
Investment Treaties; (5) Indonesia has so far entered into 64 Bilateral 
Investment Treaties; and has filed 5 Investment Treaty claims; (6) India has so 
far entered into 84 Bilateral Investment Treaties; and has filed 14 investment 
Treaty claims; (7) Laos has so far entered into 24 Bilateral Investment Treaties; 
and has filed 2 Investment Treaty claims; (8) Malaysia has so far entered into 68 
Bilateral Investment Treaties; and has filed 2 Investment Treaty claims; (9) 
Mongolia has so far entered into 44 Bilateral Investment Treaties; and has filed 
four Investment Treaty claims; (10) Pakistan has so far entered into 47 Bilateral 
Investment Treaties; and has filed 8 investment Treaty claims; (11) Philippines 
has so far entered into 37 Bilateral Investment Treaties and has filed 4 
investment Treaty claims; (12) Republic of Korea has so far entered into 91 
Bilateral Investment Treaties and has filed one investment Treaty claim; (13) 
Japan has so far entered into 22 Bilateral Investment Treaties; (14) Singapore 
has so far entered into 41 Bilateral Investment Treaties; (15) Sri Lanka has so far 
entered into 28 Bilateral Investment Treaties and has filed three Investment 
Treaty Claims; (16) Thailand has so far entered into 39 Bilateral Investment 
Treaties and has filed one Investment Treaty claim; (17) Vietnam has so far 
entered into 60 Bilateral Investment Treaties and has filed 4 Investment Treaty 
claims. 
36 In 2013- 30 BITs were signed and 14 IIAs signed bringing the total number of 
agreements to 3,236 by December 2013.  
37 Several BITs were terminated for instance by South Africa, and Indonesia.  
Bolivia, Ecuador, Venezuela has withdrawn from the ICSID Convention in 2007, 
2009 and 2011 respectively. 
38 From T.S. Eliot’s poem: “The Hollow Men”:  
“This is the way the world ends 
not with a bang, but a whimper”. 
